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FEDERAL INCOME TAX-INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, SECTION 102-
THE GIFT EXCLUSION-DIVERGENCE BETWEEN THE TAX AND DISTRICT
COURTS IN THEIR TREATMENT OF SIMILAR FACTUAL PATTERNS ARISING
UNDER THE GIFT EXCLUSION LEADS TO THE REVERSAL OF THE TAX
CouRT-Carter v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1971).
Whether payments to the widow by the decedent's corporate em-
ployer constitute compensation or gift1 for the purposes of determining
income is an issue frequently litigated.2 Until recently, it was assumed
that the factual considerations necessary for a resolution of the issue
were only subject to a narrow latitude of appellate review.8 In Carter
v. Commissioner,4 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge Friendly, took an innovative
approach to resolving the issue" which may have repercussions in the
area of appellate review.6
In Carter, the taxpayer, Mrs. Carter, received payments from her
deceased husband's employer. The amounts of these payments
equaled what the decedent would have earned under an employment
contract had he lived out the year.7  The taxpayer failed to report
these payments on her income tax return for that year and the Internal
Revenue Commissioner assessed a deficiency against the taxpayer for
such failure. The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner's determi-
nation s and the taxpayer appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
1. Section 102 of the INT. REV. CODE of 1954 excludes "gifts" among other items
from consideration in computing the taxpayer's gross income under section 61. See gen-
erally Klein, An Enigma in the Federal Income Tax: The Meaning of the Word "Gift",
48 MiNN. L. REv. 215 (1963).
2. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 280 (1960); Carter v. Commissioner,
453 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1971). See Note, Payments to Widows of Corporate Execu-
tives and Employees-Gifts or Income?, 49 VA. L. REv. 74 (1963) [hereinafter cited
as Payments]. See generally J. CHOMmIm, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 19 (1968).
3. See notes 20-21 infra and accompanying text.
4. 453 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1971).
5. Whereas the Fourth, Sixth and Eighth Circuits in reversing the Tax Court have
based their opinions on determinations that the Tax Court was erroneous in its factual
conclusions, (See e.g., Estate of Olsen v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 671 (8th Cir. 1962);
Poyner v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1962); Estate of Kuntz v. Commis-
sioner, 300 F.2d 849 (6th Cir. 1962)). Carter inquired into the conflicting decisions
of the Tax and district courts.
6. See text accompanying notes 9-11 infra.
7. Remaining salary payments would have amounted to $8,653.80 and the decedent's
annual proportionate share under the firm's profit-sharing plan would have equaled
$51,477.04. 453 F.2d at 62.
8. Estate of Carter, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1407 (1970).
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peals. Directing comment to what it determined to be divergent treat-
ment of similar factual patterns under the gift exclusion by the Tax Court
as contrasted with the federal district courts, the court of appeals
determined that it could not support such a variance and reversed the
findings of the Tax Court.9 This decision appears to conflict with the
relatively recent Supreme Court ruling in Commissioner v. Duberstein°
emphasizing the role of the trier of fact and the limited scope of ap-
pellate review in this area of the law.11
Prior to Duberstein certain objective criteria were used by the Tax and
district courts to determine whether payments to widows of corporate
employees were intended as compensation and were therefore taxable
income under section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code,12 or as gifts and
were thereby excluded from income by the operation of section 102.13
These objective criteria were utilized by the courts to determine the
dominant intent of the transferor, thereby establishing the taxable
status of the property.' 4  Since Duberstein these factors have been de-
emphasized by the Tax Court and replaced by others more inclusive."5
9. 453 F.2d at 70. The court also based its reversal on a finding that the judge
was clearly erroneous on an evidentiary matter. But it is apparent from a reading of
the case that the court placed primary emphasis on the divergence between the Tax
and district courts in the gift exclusion area rather than the evidentiary concern. Id. at
70.
10. 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
11. Id. at 290. In Duberstein, the Court held that characterization of the receipt of
an automobile as gift or income for federal income tax purposes was to be deter-
mined by the dominant motivation of the transferor. Moreover the court concluded
that the trier of fact's assessment of the dominant motive was not to be reversed unless
clearly erroneous.
12. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 61, which states in pertinent part, "[Gjross income
means all income from whatever source derived. .. ."
13. Id. § 102, which states in pertinent part, "Gross income does not include the
value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance."
The formulated criteria were: whether the payments were made to the widow rather
than the decedent's estate; whether there was an enforceable obligation against the
corporation to make such payments to the decedent's widow; whether the widow had
ever been employed by the corporation; whether the corporation realized any income
benefit for making such payments; and whether prior to his death the decedent had been
fully compensated for his services to the corporation. 453 F.2d at 64; see Estate of
Luntz, 29 T.C. 647 (1958); Estate of Foote, 28 T.C. 547 (1957); Estate of Hellstrom,
24 T.C. 916 (1955).
14. Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34 (1937). The Bogardus holding was two-
pronged. First, the taxable status of transferred property depends upon the intent of the
transferor. Second, intent is a question of law, or at least a mixed question of law
and fact.
15. The post-Duberstein factors are decidedly more sophisticated. For example,
whether the husband, the widow, or the family of either holds a controlling interest in
the stock of the corporation; whether or not the corporation has followed a policy of
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This has resulted in the establishment of a presumption by the Tax Court
that, in the absence of unusual circumstances, all payments to survivors
of deceased employees are considered compensation.'
In Duberstein, the Court reaffirmed the rule established in Bogardus
v. CIR17 that the dominant intent of the transferor was the standard
for determining the taxable status of a transfer of property.'8 But the
Court refused to follow the additional holding of Bogardus that the
determination of whether the transaction was compensation or gift was
a question of law subject to broad appellate review.' 9 Rather, the
Court held such a determination was solely a question of fact to be
decided by the trier of fact,20 thereby necessarily restricting the scope
of appellate review. 2 Certain members of the Court recognized the
deleterious effects of removing the opportunity for appellate review;
22
however, it was the opinion of the Duberstein majority that such ef-
fects should be remedied by the legislature.23
declaring dividends; whether the corporation has sufficient surplus out of which to de-
clare a dividend; whether the payments are related in amount to the husband's salary;
whether the payments have been determined in deference to the widow's needs; the
balance between the income of the widow and her necessary expenses. See, e.g., Ivan
Y. Nickerson, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1508 (1960); Estate of Louis Rosen, 21 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 316 (1962); Payments, supra note 2, at 97.
16. 453 F.2d at 66; see Payments, supra note 2, at 123.
17. 302 U.S. 34 (1937).
18. 363 U.S. at 285-86, citing Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34 (1937).
19. 302 U.S. at 39.
20. 363 U.S. at 289, where the Court stated:
Decision of the issue presented in these cases must be based ultimately on the ap-
plication of the fact-finding tribunal's experience with the mainsprings of human
conduct to the totality of the facts of each case. The nontechnical nature of the
statutory standard, the close relationship of it to the data of practical human ex-
perience, and the multiplicity of relevant factual elements, with their various com-
binations, creating the necessity of ascribing the proper force to each, confirm
us in our conclusion that primary weight in this area must be given to the con-
clusions of the trier of fact. (Emphasis added).
21. 363 U.S. at 290-91, citing FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a), which provides: "Findings
of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses." See
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
22. For example, Justices Douglas and Whittaker in their dissenting opinions would
have reaffirmed the entire Bogardus decision, maintaining the broad purview of the
appellate courts and thereby insuring a certain degree of consistency in the application
of the tax laws within a particular circuit. 363 U.S. at 293. Justice Frankfurter in
his concurring opinion cautioned against setting "fact-finding bodies to sail an il-
limitable ocean of individual beliefs and experiences" and, while recognizing the futility
of an attempt to define precisely what constituted a gift, he formulated a "presump-
tive rule placing the burden upon the beneficiary to prove the payment wholly unrelated
to. . .services to the enterprise." Id. at 297, 296.
23. The majority concluded: "If there is fear of undue uncertainty or overmuch
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The Duberstein opinion operated to relieve the Tax Court, to some
degree, of the watchful eye of the appellate courts. The Tax Court
had interpreted the decision as an indication that it could utilize all
relevant evidence and adopt a more restrictive notion of what constituted
a gift.24 It is this approach that the court rejected in Carter. The Carter
court interpreted Duberstein as both reaffirming and reemphasizing, not
restricting, the definition of "gift" previously developed by the courts.
25
It was the court's opinion that in applying the broader spectrum of
factors allowable under Duberstein, the Tax Court had been utilizing a
presumptive rule,26 the practical effect of which was that "in the absence
of unusual circumstances demonstrating compassion, all payments to
survivors of deceased employees [were] considered to be compensa-
tion. '27  This, the court determined, was a trend28 operating to the
detriment of the taxpayer and causing an unacceptable disparity be-
tween the Tax Court and the district courts in their respective treat-
litigation, Congress may make more precise its treatment of the matter by singling out
certain factors and making them determinative of the matter . " Id. at 290.
24. 453 F.2d at 65.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 66.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Joshel v. Commissioner, 296 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1961), affirming 19
CCH Tax Ct. Mer. 1349 (1960), wherein the court stated that in effect the Tax Court
was attempting to institute the test proposed by the government in Duberstein that the
Supreme Court had rejected, namely, that as an ordinary matter payments by a cor-
poration cannot be a gift. The court nevertheless affirmed, stating:
However, Duberstein lays down the rule that in a case such as this appellate re-
view is "quite restricted." The findings of the Tax Court must be accepted unless
clearly erroneous and we may not substitute our inferences for those of that
court. . . . As we read Duberstein, it is not within our power to change the re-
sult. Id. at 648 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Smith v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 778 (3d Cir. 1962), affirming the Tax Court
in a very close factual determination impliedly accepting the Tax Court's interpreta-
tion of Duberstein. The court stated: "We cannot exceed the narrow function as-
signed to us, regardless of what others have done." Id. at 782 (emphasis added). But
see Poyner v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1962), wherein the court did not
feel as constrained by the "clearly erroneous" rule as the Tenth Circuit. The court said,
"In every prior (pre-Duberstein) Tax Court case, essentially identical facts were held
sufficient to support the conclusion that the dominant motive was sympathy for the
taxpayer's widowed position . . . . The Supreme Court in Duberstein did not destroy
the authority of the earlier Tax Court cases and the guides enunciated in them for dis-
covering motivation." Id. at 291-92. In Estate of Olsen v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 671
(8th Cir. 1962), the court of appeals cited Bogardus rather than Duberstein, impliedly in
support of the proposition that Duberstein had not altered the substantive law of the
area. Id. at 674; see Estate of Kuntz v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 849 (6th Cir. 1962).
The split of circuits seems to be based upon the various courts' interpretations of the
scope of review allowed. With the Second Circuit lined up with the Fourth, Sixth and
Eighth in opposition to the Third and Tenth, some clarification from the Supreme Court
of the United States would seem appropriate.
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ment of the gift exclusion.2 9  That is, since the Duberstein decision,
with a single partial exception, all such payments had been found by
the Tax Court to be income,30 whereas the trend of decision in the
district courts had been to hold such payments to be gifts.31 The
court, although recognizing "forum shopping" to be inherent in the
system of tax collection by the mere existence of more than one com-
petent court, emphasized that:
[Tihe result should [not] depend on whether a widow could afford to
pay the tax and sue for a refund [in the district court] rather than avail
herself of the salutary remedy Congress intended to afford in estab-
lishing the Tax Court and permitting determination before payment.
32
The problem of uniformity in the application of the tax laws was
previously considered by the Second Circuit in Bessenyey v. Commis-
sioner." There, in a decision also written by Judge Friendly, the
court confronted the issue of precisely what consideration should be
29. 453 F.2d at 68-69. But cf. the dissenting opinion by Judge Davis where he re-
ferred to such variance but concluded that Duberstein left the cure to the legislature.
Id. at 71; see Payments, supra note 2, at 123.
30. Id. at 66. See generally Hauser, Voluntary Corporate Payments to Widows,
44 TAxEs 110 (1966).
31. 453 F.2d at 67, where the court stated:
The course of decision in the district courts has been quite different from that in
the Tax Court. Payments to a survivor, not specifically characterized as compensa-
tion, have been rather consistently held to be gifts .... Quite obviously, the Tax
Court and the district courts have been traveling different paths.
See, e.g., Rice v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Wis. 1961), wherein the district
court acknowledged the changed position of the Tax Court regarding the interpretation
of the term "gift" but nevertheless reaffirmed its own position that Duberstein did not
propose new substantive law. Id. at 226.
32. 453 F.2d at 69; see J. CHOMI, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 253 (1968);
Carey, Choosing Tax Procedures for Tactical Advantage, 40 NOTaE DAME LAWYER
363, 369 (1965); Hoffman & Davidson, Payments to Widows of Deceased Employees-
Gift or Compensation Under the Federal Income Tax, 8 TAX COUNSELORS Q. 385
(1964); Note, 35 U. CN. L. REv. 644 (1966).
33. 379 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1967). In Bessenyey, the court dealt with sections
162, 165 and 212 of the Internal Revenue Code which required a determination of the
intent of the taxpayer in engaging in a particular transaction. The taxpayer in Bes-
senyey sought deduction for losses sustained in the operation of a horse breeding enter-
prise, but the Commissioner denied the deduction determining that the taxpayer's In-
tent in entering into the transaction was for a recreational rather than a profitable
purpose. Both the district court and the appellate court upheld the Commissioner. In
the 1929 Tax Reform Act, Congress intervened to alleviate some of the litigation in this
area. New section 183(d) applies a presumption that a profit motive exists if, in the
case of an activity consisting of breeding, training, showing or racing of horses,
there is a showing of profit in two or more of the taxable years in a period of seven
consecutive taxable years preceding the taxable year in question. Similar legislation
in the gift exclusion area would greatly alleviate the problems involved in Carter. See
363 U.S. at 286 n.8.
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given to inconsistencies in the treatment of comparable factual pat-
terns in the diverse forums available to the taxpayer. As the court
then read Duberstein, "[s]uch a failure [was] not enough for reversal." 4
That is, such a finding did not render the lower court's decision
"clearly erroneous." 35  Thus, the Bessenyey court, unlike the court in
Carter, felt constrained by the "clearly erroneous" standard to uphold
the trial judge and permit him freedom to "follow his bent" even
though this would result in "the unfortunate consequence of lessening
the predictability peculiarly essential in tax matters."3 6
This analysis of Duberstein by the Second Circuit in Bessenyey is
difficult to reconcile with that of Carter. Ostensibly, Carter repre-
sents an expansion of appellate review in the area of the law of taxa-
tion, and necessarily an encroachment on the Duberstein principle.
The court disapproved the judicial practice of allowing the taxable
status of a particular transaction to be governed by the forum chosen.
The court rejected the presumptive approach adopted by the Tax
Court to resolve the gift exclusion problem and directed the trial court
to remove this divergency by adhering to the pre-Duberstein guide-
lines.3 7  Notably, these guidelines have been more favorable to the
taxpayer and it can be expected that in the Second Circuit the Tax
Court will be forced to apply these factors to reach a like result.
K.L.M.
34. 379 F.2d at 257.
35. See note 21 supra.
36. 379 F.2d at 257. The court also stated that if their objective were uniformity or
were they at liberty to reweigh the evidence, they would reverse.
But we have been instructed that these are not the proper criteria for an ap-
pellate court when a tax case turns on an issue of intent. . . . "[Aippellate re-
view of determinations in this field must be quite restricted," and the findings of a
trial judge ... are not to be upset unless "clearly erroneous". . . . While we do
have "a definite and firm conviction", that the judge here did not make good on
the (Duberstein) Court's prophecy of a "natural tendency of professional triers
of fact to follow one another's determinations, even as to factual matters",.., as
we read Duberstein such a failure is not enough for reversal. Id. at 256-57.
37. The court did not insist that the pre-Duberstein guidelines were the only fac-
tors the trial court should consider. Rather, it concluded:
[Wihen the Supreme Court wrote as it did in Duberstein, it could reasonably have
expected the Tax Court to continue to observe the sensible guidelines last enunci-
ated in Luntz ... supplemented by such others as experience should prove to be
relevant. .. . 453 F.2d at 69.
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